Equal Rights by Birth: Supreme Court’s Landmark Ruling in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020)
INTRODUCTION
The landmark judgment in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [Civil Appeal No. Diary No. 32601 of 2018] decided by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India on 11 August 2020, clarified the interpretation of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The decision settled the conflicting positions laid down in Prakash v. Phulavati and Danamma v. Amar regarding the coparcenary rights of daughters in Hindu Undivided Families governed by Mitakshara law.
ISSUE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
The central issue before the Court was:
“Whether a daughter can claim coparcenary rights in her father’s ancestral property if the father died before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005?”
In simpler terms, the Court had to decide whether the amended Section 6 applied retrospectively and if daughters had coparcenary rights by birth, irrespective of whether the father (coparcener) was alive on 9.9.2005, the date of commencement of the amendment.
ARGUMENT ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF UNION OF INDIA, BY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
Shri Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Union of India, argued that:
- The 2005 amendment was retroactive (not retrospective) and intended to bring gender parity in coparcenary rights.
- Daughters become coparceners by birth, irrespective of the father’s death before or after 2005.
- The amendment did not disturb prior partitions before 20.12.2004 (the date the Bill was introduced in Rajya Sabha).
- The requirement of registered partition under Section 6(5) is directory, not mandatory.
- He contended that requiring both the father and daughter to be alive on 9.9.2005 would defeat the object of the amendment, and birth alone should confer the right.
ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL AND AMICUS CURIAE, MR. R. VENKATARAMANI
Mr. R. Venkataramani submitted:
- There is no real conflict between Phulavati and Danamma—both recognized the prospective nature of the amendment.
- He cautioned against reopening old oral or informal partitions, as that would create legal chaos.
- He emphasized that while daughters were conferred rights by birth, the amendment should apply prospectively, i.e., from 9.9.2005 onward.
- The rights conferred must not defeat or disturb settled transactions or alienations made before the amendment.
ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY ADVOCATE MR. AMIT PAI
Mr. Amit Pai strongly argued that:
- The substitution of Section 6 should be interpreted in light of the Statement of Objects and Reasons—to remove gender discrimination.
- The concept of “living daughter of a living coparcener” laid down in Prakash v. Phulavati is alien to the statutory text.
- Coparcenary by birth must be acknowledged as a continuing right, not dependent on the survival of the father/coparcener on a specific date.
- Courts should not read in words that do not exist in the statute.
REASONING
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Arun Mishra, held that:
- The amended Section 6 confers the status of coparcener to daughters by birth, like sons, and the father need not be alive as on 9.9.2005.
- Coparcenary is a birthright, and therefore, living daughters of a coparcener shall enjoy coparcenary rights even if the father died before 9.9.2005.
- The explanation to Section 6(5) was inserted to avoid sham transactions and requires registered or court-decreed partitions to be valid after 20.12.2004.
- Oral partitions, though recognized earlier, must now be backed by evidence.
- The judgment overruled the restrictive view in Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju, and affirmed the broader interpretation in Danamma v. Amar.
- A daughter becomes a coparcener in a Hindu Mitakshara joint family by birth, in the same manner as a son.
- This right is retroactive in nature, stemming from birth.
- The daughter can exercise this right from 09.09.2005, provided she was alive on that date.
- The survival of the father (coparcener) on 09.09.2005 is NOT a precondition for the daughter to claim her coparcenary status.
- The statutory fiction of a “notional partition” under the old S.6 does not disrupt the coparcenary or preclude a daughter’s claim if the father died pre-2005.
- Only partitions effected by registered deed or court decree before 20.12.2004 are saved and bar a daughter’s claim under the Amendment.
CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma is a monumental step towards gender justice in Hindu succession law. The Court unequivocally held:
This judgment harmonizes the law, rectifies the conflict between Prakash and Danamma, and gives full effect to the legislative intent of the 2005 Amendment to eliminate gender-based discrimination in coparcenary rights, ensuring daughters are true equal coparceners by birth.

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